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Abstract 
 
 In this paper I examine the interrelation between monetary and non monetary 
incentive measures and the performance of a betting firm in the Czech Republic. 
Previous studies have focused either solely on monetary measures in order to 
examine the positive and adverse monetary incentive effects or on measuring the 
effect of certain non monetary managerial objectives and often on the level of 
top managers. I argue that the monetary and non monetary incentive measures 
should be analyzed separately as they influence the final outcome in a methodol-
ogically different way and that the analysis on lower level of organization can 
bring more reliable data. The evidence from unique set of medium term data 
from the Czech betting firm shows the possible positive effect of increased wage 
variability on its performance while the effect of trainings and nonmonetary 
rewards were proven as insignificant. 
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Introduction 
 
 In recent years, the fundamental discussion about effects of monetary and 
nonmonetary managerial measures applied in firms to stimulate the performance 
of agents is taking place. While in the past, the economics of the firm and organiza-
tion has been rather a prolongation of macroeconomic postulates or a field of 
study of sociologists and psychologists, during last three –four decades the situation 
has changed. We are witnessing a continuous increase of number of scholars inter-
ested in the organization and their internal processes mostly focused on institu-
tions, property rights, individual motivation, knowledge and path dependence. 
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 The contemporary incentive approaches (represented mostly by B. Frey, N. 
Foss and M. Osterloh) are combining most of these streams, as they claim, that 
besides capital of the firm in form of tangible and intangible resources, true indi-
vidual motivation influences the performance of firms the most. So far, there 
have been numerous contributions to analysis of single types of motivations/ 
incentives (often split to monetary and nonmonetary), however majority of these 
have focused on empirical testing whether some single incentive measure works 
at certain conditions or not. Also the quality of data is frequently questionable, as 
these come from financial accounting (which does not always reflect the reality), 
questionnaires or statistical databanks. 
 This paper would like to contribute to the analysis of efficiency of several 
types of incentives in the Czech betting company on the lowest level of hierar-
chy (author did not come by any similar analysis dedicated to an enterprise in the 
Central and Eastern Europe
1
). The extensive data are provided by the leading 
Czech betting company (Fortuna) operating in a legislatively stable environment, 
not exposed to FX fluctuations, with oligopolistic characteristics. Other indus-
tries (other than betting) would hardly provide such a high quality data for such 
a long period suitable for chosen analysis. The hypotheses that are tested relate 
to sales effect of various managerial measures (trainings of sale staff, introduc-
tion of upside component of the wage, non monetary rewards) applied to work-
ers of the betting shops between 2004 – 2008. 
 
 
1.  Methodological Overview 
 
 The modern analysis of the firm starts with Knight’s (1921) and Coase’s 
(1937) pioneering papers about role of managers and transaction costs in firms 
and markets and for several forthcoming decades, these works were attracting 
only a little attention. Since early 70´s firms´ boundaries have started to be ana-
lyzed at first. Their existence was a subject of a research of two main branches: 
(1) “the incomplete contract economics” represented by Williamson (1971; 1979) 
who claimed, that certain centralization in the organization is needed (hence the 
explanation of firms´ boundaries) and so called (2) “contractual approach” by 
Alchian and Demsetz (1971) who claim, that there is no need for authority (and 
firm’s boundaries). Williamson’s contract theories were further developed by 
Grossmann and Hart (1986), who added dimension of property rights over assets 
                                                 
 1 E.g., Špaček (2006) analyses the consequences related with the application of new trends and 
technologies in local enterprises while other authors (e.g. Hučka, Malý and Okruhlica, 2007) are 
often dealing with linking the quality of corporate governance of local enterprises with the quality 
of market institutions. 
  
3 
of the firm and created entirely new theory of firm’s boundaries. Later attention 
turned from the boundaries to internal structure of organizations and phenomena 
of information asymmetry, agency theory, institutions, organizational structure 
etc. were introduced and the corporate governance approach converted them to 
specific principles, policies, recommendations for the stakeholders and policy 
makers (e.g. McEnally and Kim, 2010; Tricker, 2009). The knowledge and its 
various forms in firms (e.g. Nelson and Winter’s, 1982, routines, Foss’s, 2006, 
knowledge approach etc.) are attracting special attention as well. 
 Still today it seems the „oddity” of the economics of organization remains as 
is not widely accepted and incorporated yet into the main economic journals and 
teaching books. The explanation for reluctance of respected academic individu-
als to treat organizational economics seriously might be also a lack of math-
ematic and econometric formalization. As the firms are getting more service 
oriented and traditionally measurable inputs as capital, land or workforce are 
replaced by more abstract terms as individuals´ effort, knowledge, management 
practice, protection of property rights, entrepreneurship etc., the problems with 
the formalization and quantification can be well understood. Especially the role 
of managerial measures and the knowledge are changing the traditional percep-
tion of organizations today.  
 In next chapter, role of managerial and monetary measures is analyzed at firm 
(macro) level at first, followed by the more detailed individual and group over-
view of monetary incentives (Part 1.2) and finally follows summary of recent 
related researches (Part 1.3). 
 
1.1.  Incentives, Agency Theorem and Rewards 
 
 The economists tended to focus on effects of monetary incentives and re-
wards on agent’s behavior in the firms “because money represents a generalized 
claim on resources” (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1987) and is easily measurable. 
Nonetheless it is not the only measure that should be taken into consideration. 
There are generally recognized two basic types of agent’s motivations (initially 
introduced by Deci, 1972, later developed e.g. by Frey, Jensen, etc.): extrinsic 
and intrinsic. The extrinsic motivation is an individual preference of satisfaction 
of one’s needs mostly through monetary reward while intrinsic motivation is an 
individual preference, where the activity or its outcome is valued for its own 
sake and self-content.
2
 In this case the work itself satisfies an individual, without 
monetary compensation.  
                                                 
 2 Few authors deal with the intrinsic motivation as with the endogenous motivation (e.g. 
J. Tirole), but some other, e.g. Williamson (1979) accept existence of solely extrinsic motivation as 
an “extreme caricature”. 
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 Osterloh, Frey (2004) are the authors of the “Crowding out and Crowding in” 
effect of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. They show that several institutional 
factors can influence the intrinsic behavior even at non-premium societal levels.
3
 
In a nutshell said, Crowding out effect is the situation, when monetary incentives 
can damage the intrinsic motivation and thus have a negative effect on agent’s 
motivation and effort in total. They show some practical examples, e.g. when 
paying donors for donating blood undermines their willingness to donate the 
blood for free. 
 Findings of Osterloh and Frey (2004) are significant for following reasons: 
they satisfactorily explain possible adverse effect of incentives on final effort 
and outcome is in contradiction with traditional Agency theory – hence the 
Crowding out effect of monetary incentives. Furthermore. Deci (1972) claims 
that money actually lowers employee motivation by reducing the intrinsic re-
wards that an employee receives from a job, especially when the job is individu-
ally assessed as interesting. Also Kohn (1988) offers three reasons why merit 
pay systems are counterproductive: 
 1. rewards encourage people to focus narrowly on a task, to do it as quickly 
as possible and to take few risks; 
 2. extrinsic rewards can erode intrinsic interest; 
 3. and that people come to see themselves as being controlled by a reward.
4
 
 The traditional Agency theory has implications for the analysis of rewards 
and motivation. The basic outcome of the Agency theory for corporate govern-
ance theory is the alignment of interests of both principal and agents. In organ-
izational level this means, that the interest of the owner (principal) should be 
aligned with the interest of the manager and employee (agent). Unless these in-
terests are perfectly aligned, the rent seeking activities and opportunistic behav-
ior might appear, which would distort required outcome. Jensen, Meckling 
(1990, pp. 141) enlarged their original notion of Agency theory, that the rewards 
could be also negative for suboptimal performance: „Cash compensation should 
be structured to provide big rewards for outstanding performance and meaning-
ful penalties for poor performance”. Does this mean, interests between the prin-
cipal and the agent should or should not be aligned, if so, in what cases and what 
extent? The introduction of non-monetary and institutional (managerial) meas-
ures in the firm might contribute to the explanation of this dilemma. 
 Over last two decades plenty of empirical evidences have proved that aggres-
sive forms of performance incentives tend to tempt the agents to misuse these 
                                                 
 3 I.e. certain features of the intrinsic motivation appear not only with wealthy individuals who 
have saturated needs and wants, but also in wider groups of population. 
 
 4 To similar results has lead the research of Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999). 
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rules, mostly at publicly listed companies, which are both more publicly known, 
compared to private companies, and where distributed shareholder structure of-
ten lacks proper control mechanisms of the owners (much more than in private 
companies).
5
 The monetary incentives are generally considered a very effective 
tool to manage people: strong pay for performance motivates people to do ex-
actly what they are told to do (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1987). When listing 
the key effects of extrinsic motivation, also some major effects related with in-
trinsic motivation have to be mentioned. Changing the intrinsic motivation 
within the firm takes much longer, than in the former case and the outcome is 
often hardly predictable and noticeable compared with the effect of extrinsic 
motivation. Last but not least, as Frey and Osterloh (2000, p. 8) note, “… some 
of the most terrible crimes have been motivated intrinsically, at least in part. 
Envy, vengeance and the desire to dominate are not less intrinsically motivated 
than altruism, conscientiousness, and love”, therefore monetary and non mone-
tary incentives should be analyzed within one framework. 
 Today, the contributors to the agency theory admit the weak point of the direct 
monetary motivation, calling it a “managerial heroin” (Fuller and Jensen, 2002), 
however believing, that the terms could be designed in a better way to discour-
age the focus on the short term results. Furthermore, the researches on equity 
ownership of agents and incentive alignments have not even proved the link 
between these two: rather they have failed to find a proof of a significant link 
between agents´ pay and firm performance (e.g. see Barkema, Gomez and Mejia, 
1998), even have found that the relative compensation of agents has increased 
over the time, when the value of the firms has declined (Klinger et al., 2002).  
 From practical point of view the contribution of an individual is often hard to 
observe and measure especially due to the existence of free riding, information 
asymmetry and underinvestment in firm’s specific resources. Various authors 
suggest adding another layer between the Principal and Agent (e.g. see works of 
Tirole, 1986 or Alchian and Demsetz, 1971) however these then might tend to 
ally with the agents and their interests. The difficulties with the measurement of 
agent’s contribution (reward) are well explained also by the existence of two 
types of knowledge (explicit and implicit) (e.g. see Lam, 1998).  
 The Corporate Governance approach (e.g. see Tricker, 2009 applies the above 
mentioned theoretical phenomena and predominantly focuses on their explana-
tion on upper managerial levels (management directors and boards), legislative 
and institutional framework (e.g. Basel II, Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and cultural 
considerations (Anglosaxon versus German or Japanese management style) in 
                                                 
 5 E.g. the accounting malpractices in early 2000s´ in the U.S. (WorldCom, Enron, Tyco) or in 
Europe (Parmalat) or moral hazard practices at large investment banks as appeared in 2007 – 2009. 
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a real life. This approach is thus combining both the theoretical findings and 
empirical (managerial) practice and recently has resulted in tangible outputs 
minimizing the negative consequences of the incentive mismatch, information 
asymmetry etc.
6
 
 These approaches are valid for most listed large corporations in large coun-
tries. These type of companies are not so frequent in smaller and less developed 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe, still due to lower quality of institu-
tions, some corporate governance consequences can be even more fatal than in 
Western Europe. Nonetheless, the main focus of this article are the medium en-
terprises and the analysis of the effectiveness of managerial measures within 
them on lower (i.e. personal and operational) level of corporate hierarchy. 
 
1.2.  Individual and Team Dimension of Incentives in the Firm 
 
 The policies of fair and individual assessment and rewards of regular em-
ployees ( i.e. not only of top managers) are of a key importance for modern firms 
today. The firms would naturally like to support and promote more effective and 
beneficial workers as well as to identify those individuals, who are lagging be-
hind though there are also the authorities, e.g. labor unions, which tend to re-
quest opposite – i.e. egalitarian approach and conditions to all workers. There-
fore the significance of supporting individualistic achievements and competition 
should be compared against the egalitarian and cooperative (team) approach. 
 Lazear and Rosen (1981) have shown the competition between workers might 
have a positive effect on firm’s wealth because it increases individual effort 
which leads to higher productivity but it also can lead to “outright sabotage” 
(Lazear, 1989, p. 562.) and the larger this disproportion is, the more these effects 
are reflected in firm’s operations. Therefore it seems obvious that the agent’s 
individual situation
7
 and personality do matter in the firm.  
 According to Lazear (1989) there are two kinds of employees´ personalities: 
the hawks and the doves as well as there are two kinds of firms: the hawks and 
the doves. The “hawk firms” are trying to persuade the “dove employees” to come 
to work for them (and exploit them) and “hawk employees” are trying to get into 
the “dove’s firms” (to exploit the environment) but the dove employees are 
avoiding the hawk firms. Although used in a metaphorical view, this observation 
                                                 
 6 E.g. the legislation dedicated to problems of Corporate Governance (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
OECD guidelines for Corporate governance), even the existence of always more precise account-
ing principles reflects the successful transformation of the theoretical phenomena and managerial 
problems into a construction of enforceable constructions. 
 
 7 E.g. in terms of Maslow’s hierarchy. E.g. different measures work on blue collar employees 
in Africa and Western Europe. 
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leads to logical suggestion that certain individuals will always be more inclined 
for a “hawkian” i.e. rivalrian and individual style of work and relationships 
while the other group of individuals (the “doves”) would prefer more stable, 
team- and cooperative firm environment. Even at hawk-type firms (mostly the 
large corporations) Lazear (1989) calls for some “compression” in order to avoid 
negative phenomena related with too much rivalry. This interlink nonetheless 
does not explain, what factors stand behind, that certain types of firms are coop-
eration and other rivalry based. 
 A partial explanation can be found in measurability of workers’ outputs. In 
cases, where the measurability of the workers´ output is clear and based on ob-
jective measures, pay-for-performance (hawkian type) remuneration might be 
applied. Nonetheless, majority of employees´ output can’t be quantified by ob-
jective measures or described in any contracts. The main reasons are those, 
which are standing behind being certain functions organized by firm rather than 
markets – i.e. economies of scale, impossibility of writing total contract, cheaper 
information and knowledge flow etc. 
 Not only the institutional and firm specific settings should be taken into ac-
count but also certain individual personal characteristics do matter. Danthine and 
Donaldson (2008) combine the mentioned factors in one framework and do sug-
gests to involve (high level managers) into various incentive schemes. Nonethe-
less they also introduce the influence of the personal wealth position of the agent 
and show two divergent cases, where privately wealthy managers ought to be 
risk neutral (but may not be motivated enough) as long as relatively poorer man-
agers are exposing too much of their property into one asset (incentive program, 
corporate shares etc.) and therefore they might be not acting fully in line with the 
principals neither (shareholders). This factor has to be taken into account when 
analyzing the employees at lower hierarchy level in the organization (they may 
behave differently than the top managers.) 
 Besides immediate monetary incentives (ex post, ex ante rewards) or per-
formance based measures (option rights etc.), there are also alternative ways, 
how to differentiate between more and less endowed individuals within organi-
zations – promotion based systems, tournament systems etc.8 Again, these tools 
are universal neither, e.g. in certain industries, which are fundamentally stable 
and can’t be expanding at a high pace (as they operate either on saturated mar-
kets or they are operating on the declining markets
9
), the wide-applied promotion 
incentives would not be very trustful. 
                                                 
 8 E.g. see (Budinský and Valenčík, 2009) for interlink between reward and performance in 
organizations. 
 
 9 For example utility companies like distributors of gas, water, electricity or mining companies. 
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1.3.  Recent Empirical Approaches to Incentives and Remuneration 
 
 The analysis of internal environment (mostly in order to facilitate the knowl-
edge exchange) and the motivation of agents at all levels of the organization play 
a key role in contemporary economic analysis of organizations. It has become 
obvious, that these factors are significantly affecting the output and overall per-
formance of the firms. 
 Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1995) on example of steel producers from 
the US show that more liberal: i.e. “free” management of the employees, their 
various trainings, social confidence and motivational schemes are leading toward 
their rising productivity. Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2004) on the example of 
a fruit farm in England is comparing two rewarding models: one based on num-
ber of pieces of picked up fruits, second based on relative placement among the 
workers. In case of relative rewarding, the performance is rising by 50% at same 
level of quality of the output. Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen (2005) on the 
example of Danish companies is demonstrating, that the firms, which have 
higher standard deviation of salaries are producing higher value added.  
 These numerous examples of changes in rewards models/incentivisation 
might suggest that they might lead to positive results for the firm, nonetheless, 
when the incentivisation exceeds certain level, it can adversely influence the 
firms: e.g. Bloom (1999) uses the data of the major league baseball teams and 
shows, that the level of wage dispersion among team members is negatively 
related to several measures of individual and team performance. Also Pfeffer and 
Langton (1993) come to similar result on the example of researchers and their 
research capacity. Carpenter and Seki (2005) used Japanese fishermen to show, 
that the incentives to competition lead to lower level of cooperation among them 
and that the final effect might be contra-productive. Osterloh and Frey (2004) 
also show that the generous and aggressive incentive schemes lead to suboptimal 
results. 
 There are also other factors, which might influence the way, workers are 
competing or cooperating with each other. The cooperation between teams of 
researchers is described by Adams et al. (2004), who is finding out, that informa-
tion technologies are essentially making the cooperation easier and that teams 
lead by private subjects are cooperating much more and are reaching better re-
sults compared to those, which are lead by public bodies. Uhlaner (2007) have 
found that in small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”), the tacit knowledge is the 
most important component of knowledge and that incorporation of new knowl-
edge management strategies (external knowledge networks) is associated with 
higher sales. On the other hand, codification of knowledge, trainings and certifi-
cation were not found to have an effect on sales growth or the firm. 
  
9 
 It is thus clear that the contemporary authors have well described, that the 
individual and collective performance can be effectively managed and that cer-
tain measures work sometimes in an opposite direction in each firm. However, 
not many authors have attempted approaching this topic in a combined way, i.e. 
analyzing both the monetary and managerial effects in one framework and to test 
it at once. The most relevant theoretic contributors which did so at least partially 
are Frey, Osterloh, Weibel and Foss (see the list of references). 
 
 
2.  Applicable Tools for Fortuna and their Classification 
 
 Maximization of firms’ profit and value can be understood as the main goal 
of its owners and partly also of its managers. Introduction of certain managerial 
measures at Fortuna between 2004 and 2008 was therefore undertaken with the 
same goal. Assuming, the company was well equipped with tangible and intangi-
ble assets (e.g. hardware, software, network of shops etc.),
10
 besides other meas-
ures focused on costs minimization and price strategy, there remained manage-
rial tools to maximize the effective effort of Fortuna’s employees. Their short 
overview follows in order to explain options management had at their disposal. 
 
2.1.  The Managerial Tools 
 
 The managerial tools (including psychological and the tools of human re-
sources – HR) are tools which might be applied by management in the firm usually 
without large extraordinary expenditures in comparison with the expenditures 
necessary for the acquisition of certain assets (e.g. new production line etc.). 
With regards to the agency theory, asymmetric information, transaction costs etc. 
the corporate governance and the managerial practices affect the institutional 
environment within firms. Some of the most common managerial measures ap-
plied are proper organizational structure, trustworthy environment, selection of 
proper workers for each task and their development, proper promotion mecha-
nism, maintaining the affinity to the organization etc.
11
 At Fortuna the impact of 
development of workers (i.e. trainings) on their performance is analyzed. 
 Special attention should be focused on application of information technolo-
gies (IT) to manage and distribute the knowledge within the firm as the nature of 
IT cannot be linked solely with neither managerial nor asset-based measures. 
                                                 
 10 This is quite obvious assumption – the agents equipped with insufficient or even excessive 
base of resources in the firm will achieve subprime profit levels in comparison with the efficiently 
equipped peers. 
 
 11 Detailed overview of managerial measures can be found in numerous management literature. 
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The information technologies do exist to make the information flow and knowl-
edge exchange and storage faster and more efficient – „speed and reach“. On one 
hand the ownership of certain software or hardware equipment could be per-
ceived as a production resource, on the other hand without the careful inputting 
of proper information (a purely managerial hardly measurable task), the final 
result would not be optimal. Though IT is an important element for Fortuna, it 
serves rather for the raw data exchange between headquarters and shops than 
between the shops themselves, therefore not much attention is dedicated to IT in 
analysis. 
 
2.2.  Changes in Variance of the Salaries 
 
 While the management decision about the gross level of salaries is the result 
of the labor market and firms´ resources, their structure is not. The same change 
in variance of salaries in two peer firms can lead to very different results depend-
ing on mix of employees, corporate culture, information technologies, routines, 
etc. combined with equipment by the capital or resources. The propensity to 
share and transfer knowledge in the firm can be used as the explanatory factor of 
these (e.g. see Foss, 2006), though this is not the case of Fortuna, where single 
workers in shops are rather isolated from each other.  
 The variance of the salaries is the only known managerial measure, which 
can be analyzed and measured throughout various firms, throughout various 
industries, and can provide objective description of this aspect of the institutional 
environment of the firm. All other measures (see the managerial, IT or HR prac-
tices) have a rather qualitative than quantitative substance. The knowledge gov-
ernance approach (e.g. Foss, 2006) explains, that in firms and organizations, 
where the benefits of knowledge centralization and coordination role of the cen-
ter exceed the benefits of the market mechanisms, the cooperative setting of the 
firm’s institutions would be advised (to similar conclusion comes also e.g. 
Lazear, 1989). Therefore the firms, which prefer low variability of wages, are 
those, where the cooperation and team work play a key role and vice versa. 
 The cooperation predominates for the firms, which are based on manual and 
routine work and possibility of the initiative of the employee is suppressed. The 
optimum is at low levels of wage variation, the knowledge of the company is 
centralized in the firm – in its copyrights, databases, knowledge bases etc (dove 
firms).  
 Optimum at high level of wages´ variation is typical for those companies, 
which are based on human capital in terms of their individual capabilities (hawk 
firms) and the tacit knowledge in general terms is stored in their employees. Capi-
tal as a production factor does not act in main role (e.g. see the role of “experts”). 
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The employees can considerably harm each other’s business. This description 
covers professions like traders, sales representatives and derivation of these 
roles, where the individual performance is the success/failure element.
12
 
 Obviously, the largest number of the firms is falling to the “grey zone”, where 
the optimum lies between extremes of maximum egalitarian or rivalrian wages 
and Fortuna with majority of its employees in retail outlets is not the exception. 
Hence this might suggest the incentive scheme for Fortuna’s employees should 
be positioned somewhere between egalitarian and rivalrian schemes but not in 
their extremes. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis: The Effect of Monetary Incentives  
     and Trainings on Performance of Employees 
 
 In following chapter, Fortuna, its situation, assumptions and sources of data 
and limitations are described at first. Later, the hypotheses are set and tested via 
statistical tools. Finally the results are shown and analyzed. 
 
3.1.  Data and Methodology 
 
 The data used in this study originate from two sources: The Ministry of Fi-
nance of the Czech Republic (MoF), the department of Games of Chance and 
from Fortuna sázková společnost, a. s. (Fortuna) a leading Czech sports betting 
operator over the years 2004 – 2008. There are not many other industries than 
the gambling, where the effect of external factors is limited in a high extent, for 
a long period and the product offer is stable and identical in all shops.
13
 There 
are also other industries which operate in stable markets and have a strong hu-
man component (e.g. telecoms, retailers) nonetheless the frequent introduction of 
another products in these would make the eventual statistical analysis of incen-
tives less accurate. 
 As of today, Fortuna is part of a larger group of betting companies (Fortuna 
Group), with sister companies operating in Slovakia, Poland and Croatia. For-
tuna (established in 1990) is a traditional provider of various gambling services, 
                                                 
 12 Also professions where the unique idea or achievement is a matter of success are in this 
group – scientists, academics, lawyers, tax advisors etc. 
 
 13 Gambling as industry has been chosen for various reasons, but the consistency and transpar-
ency of the data are the main reason. Gambling is a tightly regulated industry, where the licenses to 
operate the Games of chance are given by MoF CR only to a limited number of parties who fulfill 
certain criteria so the new market entrants are quite rare. Also no major change of legislation has 
occurred between 2004 – 2008 (in 2009 the additional distribution channel for sports betting was 
legalized). 
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which are permitted by the MoF CR – sports betting, numeric games, video ter-
minals, virtual horse and grey hound races and these services are sold via various 
distribution channels: proprietary network on high streets (Regular shops), shops 
operated with third parties mostly in sport bars (“Fortunky”). It is selling the 
services through the phone and since January 2009 also through internet. 
 The retail network is changing over the time, nonetheless it has been quite 
stable in the selected period (1. 1. 2004 – 31. 12. 2008). Due to profitability rea-
sons, the underperforming shops have been closed or relocated therefore the base 
for this analysis is represented only by permanently operating branches at the 
same locations both on high streets and in sport bars. The process of selection of 
the proper locations for the branches is a part of know-how as locality affects 
significantly performance of the branch. 
 
T a b l e  1 
Overview of Analyzed Shops 
 1. 1. 2004 31. 12. 2008 Permanently Working Shops within the Period 
No. of Regular shops 451 465 364 
No. of Fortunky   47 132   30 
 
Source: Management of Fortuna  
 
 The proprietary Regular shops are staffed by employees of Fortuna, the op-
erations in Fortunky are managed by employees of sport bars by their own re-
sponsibility and costs. The owners of sport bars have signed the profit sharing 
agreement with Fortuna but except standard marketing support and initial train-
ing, they are not receiving any special treatment or training from Fortuna.
14
  
 More than 90% of the analyzed employees were females, the churn rate was 
stable and the product offer in shops was identical in entire network. Typically 
two to three workers are permanently employed at the shop; they are temporarily 
changing their workplace only in summer months for few days, when vacations 
are taken. 
 Before January 2006 the fixed wage system for remuneration of the employ-
ees in proprietary shops was in place. Workers were remunerated solely upon 
their work experience at Fortuna or decision of the local manager. No further 
bonuses were provided to the employees.  
 Since 1. 1. 2006 new employment contracts have been signed with all For-
tuna employees, where additional flexible part of the salary has been introduced. 
                                                 
 14 The terms of these contracts are standardized, where the commercial details depend on each 
individual case. Fortuna is providing the sport bars with IT infrastructure i.e. terminals (all shops 
are linked with the headquarters via the internet) and some basic furniture (whiteboards) and ad-
vertisement goods (city lights, logos etc.). 
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The main terms of the contract were as following: minimum monthly sales per 
shop were set by the regional director, which were then adjusted for each month 
due to No. of working days and seasonality. If the shop outperformed, employ-
ees could have split certain fixed percentage of the positive difference among 
themselves. Had the shop underperformed, employees would have had guaran-
teed certain minimum salary. There was no upper limit on bonuses. Had the sales 
consisted of extreme high odds, the shop was analyzed individually.
15
 This 
measure therefore supported also internal control of employees at the shop: if 
one employee was not performing his/her job properly, other colleagues were 
suffering as well. For the purpose of statistical analysis, the dummy variable was 
set up since 1. 1. 2006 for this case (see “W dummy for wage increase” later in 
the text). 
 Between October 2006 and June 2007 the series of trainings to improve sales 
skills of the employees took place.
16
 After initial testing phase in October 2006, 
when the trainings were provided to the employees of selected 30 shops, the 
content was adjusted to better fit Fortuna’s requirements and was afterwards 
launched to all employees at shops. After the training, regular “mystery shop-
ping” campaigns were held in to follow the change of the behavior of workers, 
nonetheless the mystery shopping results were unsatisfactory and repressive 
measures had to be undertaken. Since June 2007 all new employees are partici-
pating on such training in the first weeks of their employment at Fortuna parallel 
with the traditional training that was run before – e.g. how to operate the betting 
shop, how to explain customers the products etc. For the purpose of the statisti-
cal analysis, the dummy variable was set since 1. 1. 2007, when more than 50% 
of the employees have participated in the trainings (see “T dummy for training” 
later in the text). 
 In addition to these, for a limited period of time between March and Novem-
ber 2007, the non monetary incentive scheme has been introduced in order to 
improve the launch of new products (new fidelity clubs, the captive newspaper 
                                                 
 15 The sales plan was set in accordance with the last years´ performance of the shop and each 
shop has its own individual plan. This management decision was not intended to cut the personnel 
costs but to attempt to motivate the workers for a better performance. The variable part of the 
salary was representing at the conservative sales assumptions approximately 25% of the gross 
salary (e.g. if the employee had fixed CZK 12,000 gross salary before the change 2005, since 2006 
he had fixed salary of CZK 9,000 and CZK 3,000 as a variable part set up upon conservative sales 
assumptions). Additional monetary incentive was provided for those employees, who worked in 
shops with longer opening hours. 
 
 16 The trainings consisted of 2 working days spent with an external lector, who taught the 
workers the basic sales skills; also the vision and mission of the company has been emphasized to 
the workers. The trainings were focused on provision of explicit skills and best practices, which 
were according to the management not followed by the workers before (cross selling and upselling 
initiatives, greetings etc.). 
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sold etc.). The workers were rewarded by T-shirts, balls etc. For the purpose of 
the statistical analysis, the dummy variable was set since 1. 3. 2007 until 31. 11. 
2007 (see “N dummy for non-monetary incentives” later in the text). 
 In the meantime, Fortuna has heavily invested into improvement of its brand 
awareness, improved its product offer etc. However, these efforts were affecting 
entire sales network, while the before mentioned trainings of sales practices, 
wage adjustments and nonmonetary incentives have been applied solely on the 
proprietary network of shops and not on Fortunky.  
 This fact enables to attempt quantifying the impact of the commercial train-
ings and monetary and non monetary incentives on total performance of employ-
ees in Regular shops. 
 
3.2.  Hypotheses 
 
 The methodological approaches as shown in previous chapter suggest that 
there are several ways to managerially influence the total effective effort of the 
workers. These include decisions related with corporate culture, internal man-
agement and HR policies, trainings, promotions or remuneration structure etc. 
This methodological framework also suggests that the companies with low vari-
ability of wages are those, where workers are performing routines, they are not 
skilled and the knowledge is stored in headquarters. 
 Fortuna with its central headquarters providing quite sophisticated products 
(the odds) to the shops combined with the economies of scale, should therefore 
be the case, where the wage dispersion should be at relatively low levels. None-
theless based on the methodological framework the maximum total effective 
effort might be achieved at wage dispersion levels higher than zero because there 
is certain personal element in the work performed by the employees of Fortuna. 
The workers in the shops are the only people, through whom Fortuna directly 
communicates with its customers. They are responsible for the outfit of the 
branch, explanation of the products; these workers are with clients, when they 
are receiving their wins as well as when they are losing. 
 Therefore the moderate increase in the wage dispersion (introduction of 
a motivational scheme) is supposed to lead to a higher level of performed total 
effective effort by the employees. Ceteris paribus the increased effective effort of 
the employees should be reflected in measurable outputs – in this case increased 
sales per branch. Similarly the trainings in Fortuna which focused on develop-
ment employees’ sales skills should in line with the framework contribute to 
higher awareness of the workers about the proven sales practices (i.e. enlarged 
set of explicit skills) and thus to achieve higher sales as well. Hence, following 
hypotheses are made: 
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H1: The trainings of commercial skills of employees had a positive effect on overall 
output of employees measured by sales per shop. 
H2: The change of variability of wages had a positive effect on overall output of em-
ployees measured by sales per shop. 
H3: The temporary nonmonetary incentive measures had a positive effect on overall 
output of employees measured by sales per shop. 
 
3.3.  Results 
 
 The Difference in difference multiple regression was applied and the regres-
sion equation would have had following form
17
: 
 
R = b0 + b1*F + b2*T + b3*W + b4*N + b4*T*F+ b5*W*F + b6*N*F + error (1) 
 
where 
 R –  Regular shops monthly sales (dependent variable), 
 F –  Fortunky monthly sales (control, independent variable), 
 T –  dummy for training, 
 W – dummy for wage increase, 
 N –  dummy for nonmonetary incentives. 
 
 Multiple Regression Analysis equation is following:  
 
R = 79,10 + 2,65*F – 23,50*T + 89,40*W – 10,56*N – 0,02*T*F – 
– 0,19*W*F + 0,08*N*F                                           (2) 
 
 There is a statistically significant relationship between the variables at the 
99% confidence level. The R-Squared statistic indicates that the model as fitted 
explains 85% of the variability in Regular shops. Since the Durbin-Watson value 
is greater than 1.4, it indicates there is probably no serious autocorrelation in the 
residuals. In determining whether the model can be simplified. The coefficients 
of trainings and non monetary measures are negative (–23.5 and –10.56 respec-
tively) so the effect of their introduction on sales would be negative, nonetheless 
as the respective P-values are more than 0.6 these results are statistically insignifi-
cant. On the other hand the significance of monetary measures is higher (P-value 
0.23) and the coefficient in equation is larger than zero (+89.4). Thus while the 
Hypotheses H1 and H3 were not proven, H2 might be accepted, though at 
a subprime significance level. For more details see Annex 1. These results there-
fore still might draw some possible interpretations and implications. 
 The reasons for a such result might be:  
 (1) The relatively larger immediate marginal change in salary variance due to 
new labor contracts (0% before vs approx. 25 % on average afterwards) while 
                                                 
 17 For simplicity reasons, the other independent variables like e.g. inflation rate, GDP rate etc 
were excluded. Thanks to Witkovsky from Slovak Academy of Sciences for helpful assistance 
with statistical analysis. 
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the employees might have had certain knowledge base before the trainings took 
place, so the training could have not been marginally so much effective;  
 (2) The time consequence of the two policies changes – change of salary 
structure at first could have lead to change of behavior of employees and appli-
cation of the practices, they individually consider to work at best while the train-
ings were set by headquarters with the measures, the management considered to 
be applied (and maybe not so effective).  
 (3) The impact of a short time non monetary incentive measure in order to 
support the launch of new products in 2007 could have also blurred the effect of 
the trainings on Sales increase.  
 (4) Another reason for lower than expected influence of the trainings on total 
effective effort is due to time period, during which the trainings have taken place 
(Oct. 2006 – Jun. 2007), so no exact date can be set for the start of the change 
(Jan. 2007 was taken when the majority of shops was trained)
18
 and there were 
no restrictive measure applied immediately after the trainings.  
 (5) Last but not least, the same as the employees might take certain time to 
practice and fine tune certain sales skills, the customers also need certain time to 
accommodate to a new approach, to get to know new products and use them.  
 Based on methodological introduction, the more obvious (though not auto-
matically more significant) effect of the salary change might have been expected, 
as with a new contract the employee starts behaving differently immediately 
while the application of skills from trainings takes longer and its roll-out was 
spread out in a longer period. 
 The author had the possibility to compare the results also with other compa-
nies of the Fortuna Group (in Slovakia, Poland and Croatia) where similar meas-
ures were undertaken, nonetheless the due to regulatory, market and strategy 
changes (too strong other independent variables covering with the introduction 
of the measures) in these companies the figures would not lead to such a high 
quality data set, as those which came from Fortuna. 
 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
 The core contribution of this paper is the first empirical analysis of the monetary 
and non-monetary measures applied in the Central and Eastern European Company. 
The numerous authors agree, that there should be and often is an interrelation 
                                                 
 18 The author was testing various settings of dummy variable for this case, even the setting of 
the dummy variable from July 2007 or its incremental increase from October 2006. Nonetheless, 
these would not significantly change the results – the effect of training would still remain statisti-
cally insignificant or even negative. 
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between the managerial measures and the firm performance, nonetheless, the 
empirical results are frequently contradictive mostly because the difficult meas-
urability of the effect of single managerial decisions. 
 The unique dataset in this paper was intended to measure the effect of intro-
duction of monetary and non monetary incentive measures and trainings, how-
ever the effect of trainings and non-monetary measures on the employees´ output 
was not proven. The analysis has nonetheless shown that there might have been 
a positive effect of the introduction of the monetary measure on Company’s 
sales, though this hypothesis was proved with 77% probability only. 
 Few important consequences arise: (1) the result of this empirical analysis is 
in line with methodological approaches of other authors who claimed, that the 
monetary measures work faster and more distinctly than the non-monetary 
measure. (2) The role of additional formal knowledge (i.e. trainings) has not 
been proven to be significant for the selected pool of workers while the informal 
knowledge (assumably better utilized due to change in incentives) might have 
shown its significance.  
 The future studies could further examine the effect of monetary and non-
monetary measures on companies in other sectors and regions, further attention 
could be dedicated to examination and incorporation of organizational structure 
into the existing framework. Also the analysis on other levels of employee hier-
archy might bring interesting findings and finally, the interaction between intrin-
sic and extrinsic motivation could be examined as well. 
 
 
A n n e x e s 
 
Dependent Variable: Regular Shops 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error T-Statistic P-Value 
Constant 
Fortunky (F) 
Trainings (T) 
Wages (W) 
NonMonetary (N) 
TraingsFortunky (T*F) 
WagesFortunky (W*F) 
NonMonetaryFortun (N*F) 
  79.1023 
    2.65504 
–23.5067 
  89.4006 
–10.5637 
  –0.025346 
  –0.195271 
    0.0822687 
39.9031 
  0.252888 
95.9734 
73.953 
93.0062 
  0.566767 
  0.460983 
  0.532015 
  1.98236 
10.4989 
–0.244929 
  1.20888 
–0.113581 
–0.0447204 
–0.423598 
  0.154636 
0.0528 
0.0000 
0.8075 
0.2323 
0.9100 
0.9645 
0.6736 
0.8777 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F-Ratio P-Value 
Model 
Residual 
468382.0 
  82045.0 
  7 
51 
66911.7 
  1608.73 
41.59 0.0000 
Total (Corr.) 550427.0 58    
 
R-squared = 85.0943 %; R-squared (adjusted for d.f.) = 83.0484 %; Standard Error of Est. = 40.1089;  
Mean absolute error = 30.9993; Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.61518 
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